International negotiations for an agreement to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases are unlikely to produce concrete and comprehensive policies for effective emission reductions in the near term, not least because the policy measures being considered are economically very costly to major industries in rich countries and are unlikely to prevent 'leakage' through a re-location of carbon-intensive activities to poorer countries. An alternative or supplementary approach that is more likely to achieve carbon and methane emission reductions, and at the same time generate national and global economic benefits rather than costs, involves lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers. Past coal policies which encouraged excessive production of coal in a number of industrial countries and excessive coal consumption in numerous developing and transition economies are currently under review and in some cases are being reformed. This paper documents those distortions and outlines the circumstances under which their reform could not only improve the economy but also lower greenhouse gas emissions globally. It also provides modelling results which quantify the orders of magnitudes that could be involved in reducing those distortions. The effects on economic activity as well as global carbon emissions are examined using the G-Cubed multi-country general equilibrium model of the world economy. Both the gains in economic efficiency and the reductions in carbon dioxide emissions that could result from such reforms are found to be substantial -a 'no regrets' outcome or win-win Pareto improvement for the economy and the environment that contrasts markedly with many of the costly proposals currently being advocated to reduce greenhouse gases.
time generate national and global economic benefits rather than costs, involves lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers.
Coal policies have encouraged excessive production of coal in a number of industrial countries and excessive coal consumption in numerous developing and transition economieswhen the opposite policies are what are needed to overcome the environmental policies associated with coal mining and burning. These distortions are currently under review by numerous governments, and in some cases reforms have already begun. This paper documents those distortions and outlines the circumstances under which their reform could not only improve the economy but also lower greenhouse gas emissions globally. It also provides modelling results which quantify the orders of magnitudes that could be involved in reducing those distortions. The effects on economic activity as well as global carbon emissions are examined using the G-Cubed general equilibrium model of the world economy.
Both the gains in economic efficiency and the reductions in carbon dioxide emissions that could result from such reforms are found to be substantial. Even if just Western Europe and Japan were to gradually remove their coal production subsidies and import restrictions by 2005 (let alone raise their currently relatively low tax on coal use and impose a tax on the environmental damage from coal mining), that would lower OECD emissions of carbon dioxide by 13 per cent and global CO 2 emissions by 5 per cent. If in addition the currently low domestic price of coal in major non-OECD countries were gradually to be raised to the level in international markets, that would lower their CO 2 emissions by 4 per cent and global emissions from these combined reforms The impact of these reforms on national output and income levels are complicated because, in addition to efficiency gains, removing price distortions stimulates terms of trade changes and international capital movements. Western European countries, as net importers of coal, turn their terms of trade against themselves when they reform, which benefits Australia and the coal-exporting transition economies of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and China while harming as a group the net coal-importing other developing countries. Both transition and developing economies are projected to be better off when their coal markets also are reformed.
The environmental gain from coal market reform is achieved with gains in economic efficiency rather than economic costs -a 'no regrets' outcome or win-win Pareto improvement for the economy and the environment that contrasts markedly with many of the costly proposals currently being advocated to reduce greenhouse gases. Both gains would be even greater if Western European countries also raised their low coal consumer tax rates as they phase out their coal producer subsidies, since those consumer taxes are currently relatively low (presumably to lower the cost to electricity utilities or requiring them to use lower-quality locally mined coal).
And both gains would also be enhanced if countries taxed domestic coal production optimally so as to ensure coal mining enterprises compensate society for the pollution they cause.
Thankfully the process of lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers has already begun, with some EU economies (most notably Belgium and the UK) already advanced in dismantling their coal production subsidies and others (France and Germany) beginning to do so. And in some transition economies the low prices of coal (and also oil and gas) are gradually being raised. For example, in China many state-owned coal mines are being transferred out of the hands of the state and gradually subjected to domestic market forces. The results in this paper suggest these reforms should be applauded as a positive contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and countries should be encouraged to complete the process.
Reducing coal subsidies and trade barriers: their contribution to greenhouse gas abatement
Introduction
With respect to the environment, governments are often blamed for not doing enough things such as taxing polluters. Their reticence is understandable from a political viewpoint: the interventions advocated by environmental groups are typically harmful to the economic interests of powerful industry groups. Yet there are many situations where it would be more appropriate for environmentalists to ask governments not so much to 'do something' as to 'undo something'.
Among the innovative suggestions being made by economists for addressing environmental problems, following the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, is the removal of excessive government subsidies to pollutive activities (World Bank 1997a ). This action is attractive both because it benefits rather than retards the national economy involved and because it can be done unilaterally rather than requiring collective international action with attendant free-rider problems.
A classic example has to do with 'greenhouse' gases. The scientific community continues to debate the question as to whether the build-up of carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases is contributing to a significant warming of the earth's surface, what the economic consequences of global warming might be, and even whether the world as a whole will be better or worse off. Yet despite these gaps in our knowledge, there seems to be a widespread presumption that governments must intervene to ensure greenhouse gas emissions are reduced.
For example, 150 countries gathered in Geneva in July 1996 to reach a United Nations consensus on setting binding targets for reducing carbon emissions in stages over the next 25 years. Given the uncertainty surrounding the likelihood and possible consequences of global warming, it would seem prudent to first search for ways to reduce greenhouse gas emissions with policy changes that can be justified on standard economic and local environmental grounds.1 That is, to what extent 1 The Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1996) claims that greenhouse gas concentrations are continuing to increase, that recent years have been the warmest since at least 2 are there unambiguous win-win possibilities for reducing those emissions that would benefit the global economy and the global environment? This paper explores one such set of reforms that have recently begun to be implemented, namely reductions in government distortions to the world's coal markets, bearing in mind that coal accounts for around 30 per cent of the world's primary energy supply and 40 per cent of carbon emissions from energy use (ignoring firewood).
Since both coal mining and coal burning are pollutive, it would be optimal to tax the pollutive contributions of both production and consumption of coal. Yet we observe several industrial countries subsidizing coal mining, and many developing and former socialist countries subsidizing coal burning, either explicitly and/or implicitly with the help of coal trade barriers. To what extent is it possible that replacing those effective production and consumption subsidies with optimal taxes --or even just removing the subsidies and trade barriers --could simultaneously improve the efficiency of resource use, reduce damage to local environments, and lower greenhouse gas emissions? Some earlier studies suggest the answer might be yes (Burniaux, Martin and Oliveira-Martins 1992; Hoeller and Coppel 1992; Larson and Shah 1995) , but they are somewhat dated now and focus on all fossil fuels rather than just on coal. It is of interest to examine the contribution of coal policies alone, since policies affecting the export supply of the other fossil fuels are controlled largely by OPEC and, unlike coal policies, are not under political pressure to change. This paper addresses the issue in a series of steps. It first provides some details of the environmental externalities on the demand and supply sides of the coal market, from which it is then clear what the optimal policy interventions would be for national governments if they ignore international pollution spillovers. These are then compared with the actual policy interventions we observe in key national coal markets around the world. The evidence on the extent of divergences between domestic and international coal prices in various groups of countries shows that, as with agriculture, coal producer and consumer prices have tended to be well below border prices in developing and former socialist countries, and to be well above border prices in several large 1860, and that the balance of evidence suggests a discernable human influence on the world's climate. It agrees that significant opportunities are available in most countries to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases at no economic cost, but claims the potential risk of damage from climate change is enough to justify action beyond such 'no regrets' measures. We believe the latter judgement is difficult to make with the current stock of knowledge 3 industrial countries that are net importers of coal. The possible consequences for economic activity and greenhouse gas emissions of removing those subsidies -as has begun to happen in the 1990s --are then explored. This is done first using a simple theoretical partial equilibrium approach. Then some empirical results are summarized from a recent study that uses a global computable general equilibrium model known as G-Cubed. That model is able not only to capture the effects exposed through partial equilibrium thinking but also to take into account the possibilities for substitution in production and consumption between products (including within the energy group) both within and across countries when domestic relative prices are changed in some or all regions. Notwithstanding the reforms of recent years, those results suggest that significantly lower greenhouse gas emissions could result from further reducing the remaining coal mining subsidies in the OECD. Even larger benefits would result if poorer countries also raised their artificially low domestic prices for coal. Some qualifications and the environmental, trade, and policy implications of the analysis are discussed in the final section of the paper.
Environmental externalities and optimal policy intervention in the coal market
Traditionally, the externality most commonly thought of with respect to coal was local air pollution in the form of smog generated from the burning of coal by households and industry.
That pollution is substantially greater per unit of energy provided than that generated from other fuel sources (except perhaps from firewood). (Steenblik and Coroyannakis 1995) . Government subsidies and protection from imports for such mines thus add present and future production externalities to the morecommonly understood local, regional and global externalities on the consumption side from coal burning.
These facts suggest the social marginal benefit curve in a national coal market is below the private demand curve, and the social marginal cost curve is above the private supply curve, and more so if the welfare of other countries also is taken into account. Even ignoring the latter, the optimal intervention in the presence of these externalities (assuming optimal interventions are in place in all other markets) involves taxing the undesired pollution both from coal mining and from coal burning.3 Thus the removal of any subsidies to coal mining or coal consumption, including indirect subsidies via trade policies, would be at least a partial step towards the optimal measures and levels of government intervention in coal markets.
much carbon per unit of energy as does coal, and gas only about half as much (World Bank 1997b, Table 4 .1). 3 In the past a case might have been made for some restriction of coal imports on energy supply security grounds, but that is no longer valid now that coal is a much smaller contributor to energy in coal-importing countries. India. In examining these distortions, it is therefore helpful to separate the high-priced OECD countries from the low-priced non-OECD countries.
OECD countries
Within the OECD, North American and Australasian coal markets are reasonably free of coal market distortions. In Western Europe, by contrast, costs of coal production per ton are two to three times import prices. These differences are maintained partly by restricting imports to raise the domestic coal price, partly by the treasury subsidizing producers directly, and partly by imposing minimum purchase obligations on electricity generating utilities, requiring them to buy certain volumes of coal from local mines at above international prices. In Germany, for example, the electricity utilities agreed to buy during 1992-95 at least 87 per cent of their coal needs from local mines, with only a quarter of that coal priced at import parity and the rest at more than twice the import price --in return for which the utilities have been allowed to pass on the high input cost to electricity consumers, who also contribute an 8 per cent tax to help finance the coal producer subsidy (Newbery 1995) .
The producer subsidy equivalent (PSE) of assistance to production of hard coal, shown in Table 1 as a percentage of the import price, reveals that assistance to European Union and Japanese coal production has been very large and has grew rapidly during the 1980s. By the early 1990s it was equivalent to providing a domestic producer price that was more than three times the import price in Belgium and Germany, two times in Spain, and 40 per cent higher in France and the UK. There has in addition been considerable assistance to coal producers that is not pricerelated. In fact, over the 1986-92 period the assistance to production shown in Table 1 , as a fraction of total assistance, was just two thirds for the UK, about half for Germany and Spain, only a third for Belgium and less than one tenth for France (IEA (1993 and earlier editions) and, for France, EC (1992)).
These estimated rates of assistance exceed those for agriculture in Western Europe and Japan. As shown in the middle rows of Table 1 , in the early 1990s the PSE is estimated to have averaged about 90 per cent of the border price for EU agriculture, compared with 163 per cent for EU coal. When expressed on a per worker basis, the difference in support has been even larger. During 1987-93, for example, the support in the EU for current production per full-time worker equivalent was $11,400 for farmers (OECD 1994) , compared with two to four times that for coal miners. Indeed total assistance per coal miner employed was close to $90,000 for Belgium and Germany (nearly half of which was supporting current production) and $38,000 for the UK in 1990 (see final three rows of Table 1 ). And, based on EC (1992) data, it was well over $100,000 for France. According to these estimates --which were three times as large in real terms as a decade earlier --it would be far cheaper to close all coal production in these countries (and Spain) and pay miners their current wage to do nothing.
Estimates of the extent of consumer price distortion are more difficult to determine, but the IEA (1994b) does provide user prices and import prices for coal. Based on those data, it 7 would appear that for Western Europe as a whole, both coking and steaming coal prices for users as compared with the prices of imports from outside Western Europe have become steadily greater. On average during 1984-91, coking coal was priced to industry at about 15 per cent above the price of the most expensive imported US coal, and steaming coal was about 40 per cent above for electricity utilities and 55 per cent above for industry users. Again this rivals the extent to which food prices for consumers exceed border prices, which for the EU averaged 55 per cent during 1979 -93 (OECD 1994b . In addition, because coal mined in the EU is 'dirtier' than its imported coal (Steenblik and Coroyannakis 1995, Table 7 ), the utilities' minimum local purchase obligations require more to be spent on filters to burn the higher-priced domestic coal.
An indication of the extent to which user prices in the most protective European countries exceed those in the United States is given in Table 2 . Steaming coal in the early 1990s was four times higher than the US price in Germany, twice as high in the United Kingdom, and between 1.3 and 2.3 times as high in Belgium and France. Not surprisingly, electricity prices were roughly double those of the US as well. Some of those differences may reflect costs of transporting coal (and other energy raw materials) to power plants, some is due to different preferences for preserving the environment, and some may reflect the greater need to tax emissions in densely populated Europe; but much of it is due to protective producer coal subsidies and associated barriers to coal import competition.
During the mid-1990s, these subsidies have come under domestic political pressure to be reduced. Belgium and the United Kingdom have begun the process, and now France and Germany are starting to make commitments to gradually reduce government support to coal mining over the next decade. The potential to reform these policies is thus very real, making an examination of the effects of such reform timely.
Non-OECD countries
Obtaining estimates of price distortions in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and other transition and developing countries is more problematic. What is clear, though, is that in the past coal has been grossly underpriced there, which helps explain the relatively high consumption levels in some of those countries. Except in Hungary, the price of steaming coal paid by electricity 8 utilities in Eastern Europe has been only a fraction (half or less) of the border price. Industry users paid somewhat more, but they still received it at well below its opportunity cost on the world market. The extent of underpricing is currently being reduced though, with Hungary's coal prices now matching the user prices in Western Europe. Even so, it appears from the lower part of Table   2 that electricity users in the early 1990s were still hugely subsidised in Eastern Europe, as in India, with prices between one third and one half those of the United States. Thus the OECD's GREEN model, calibrated to 1985, assumes that coal prices average close to half border prices for each of Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, China and India, which together account for all but a sixth of the non-OECD coal market (Lee, Oliveira-Martins and Mensbrugghe 1994) . Table 3 shows that even up to the mid-1990s coal prices in China were less that three-quarters of border prices, although the higher 'market' as distinct from 'plan' prices there are applying to an increasing proportion (now more than half) of sales as non-state owned mines develop (Wang 1996) . 5
What would be the implications of completely dismantling these coal subsidies and trade barriers? We begin using a simple theoretical partial equilibrium approach and then turn to some empirical results that draw on a global computable general equilibrium model known as G-Cubed.
Effects of dismantling coal subsidies: partial equilibrium analysis
Consider the coal market of a small open economy under the following assumptions: coal is a homogeneous product; the domestic coal-mining industry competes with imports that are freely available at a landed price of P w ; there are negative production and consumption externalities associated with coal mining that are both intra-and inter-national/global such that the private marginal cost curve for mining, S P , is below the national social marginal cost curve S s which in turn would be below the global social marginal cost curve (not shown) if international 5 A rough preliminary set of estimates by the World Bank (1997b) suggests the rate of underpricing of coal has halved in EEFSU and fallen by one-sixth in China and India during the 1990s. Why coal, like food, should have been underpriced in poorer countries and overpriced in coal-importing richer countries, and why those policies are now beginning to be reformed, are important questions. Space limitations preclude discussing them here, but see pollution spillovers were to be taken into account, and the private marginal benefit curve D p is above the national social marginal benefit curve D s which in turn would be above the global social benefit curve (not shown) if international pollution spillovers were to be taken into account; and the demand and supply curves incorporate changes in productivity and any international factor movements that would accompany domestic price changes. Under these conditions, and assuming also that in related markets in the economy there are no other distortions nor any externalities that are not offset with optimal intervention measures, then this coal market can be depicted as in Figure 1 .
Laissez faire versus optimal intervention
Equilibrium in Figure 1 in the absence of any government intervention in this coal market would involve a domestic price equal to P w that would induce OQ being produced and OC being consumed each year, with QC imports satisfying the excess domestic demand at that price. These levels differ from the optimal levels, however, given the presence of externalities in this market.
To simplify the analysis, assume transactions costs of taxing environmental damage at the source (e.g., water contamination from mining or sulphur emissions from burning coal) are sufficiently expensive as to make coal production and consumption taxes the optimal intervention instruments, and that this small nation ignores its contribution to neighbouring countries' and global pollution. Then on the production side, OQ* is the optimal output level since it is where the national social marginal cost curve S s intersects the import price line that represents the opportunity cost of producing domestically. That output level would be attained if a tax on coal production were imposed which lowered the domestic price received by miners from P w to P q *.
And on the demand side, OC* is the optimal consumption level. At that level the curve representing the national social marginal benefit from coal burning, D s , intersects the import price line; it would be attained if a tax on coal consumption were imposed which raised the domestic price paid for coal from P w to P c *.
The welfare effects of imposing the tax on production can be shown as areas in Figure 1 .
That tax reduces coal producer welfare by aefg, raises government tax revenue by ahfg, boosts Anderson (1995a,b) .
the welfare of those outside this market who are harmed by coal mining activities by hmef, and thus increases net economic welfare in this country by (-aefg + ahfg + hmef =) hme. Welfare also is increased by imposing the optimal tax on coal consumption. In that case coal consumer welfare is lowered by abcd, government tax revenue is raised by ajcd, the welfare of those outside this market but within the country who are harmed by local pollution from coal burning activities is raised by bkjc, and thus net economic welfare in this country is increased by (-abcd + ajcd + bkjc =) bkj.
Effects of removing coal production subsidies
Now suppose this economy has in fact put in place a tax on coal consumption that has raised the domestic price to P c * and reduced coal use to the optimal level of OC*; but instead of also putting in place a tax on domestic production it has subsidised coal mining by offering a producer price of P q which has induced production to the level OQ q and thus lowered imports to Q q C*. 6 Removing that inappropriate production subsidy would lower production by QQ q and producer welfare by aeru, but it would also lower government outlays by atru and boost the welfare of those outside this market who are harmed by coal mining activities by emnr, hence net economic welfare would be greater by emnt. 7 (If the government not only abolished the producer subsidy but also imposed the optimal producer tax of P w P q *, there would be the additional net social welfare gain of hme, or a total gain of hnt.) Thus both the economy and the environment in this reforming economy would improve by removing that coal production subsidy.
Should enough small open economies simultaneously remove their subsidies to coal mining (and replace any associated coal import tariff with an optimal consumption tax -see footnotes 2 and 3), import demand for and hence the price of coal in the international market would rise. That would reduce coal consumption globally and induce a substitution towards using other fuels, virtually all of which are less environmentally damaging and in particular contribute less greenhouse gases than coal. Thus there would be an environmental improvement not only in 6 The equivalent result would be achieved with an import tariff of P c *P w and an additional production subsidy of P q P c *. In that case government direct outlays to producers would have been smaller but there would have been no consumer tax revenue, so the net impact on government revenue is the same. 7 If P q = P c *, then only an import tariff would have been necessary and the equivalent reform would be a 11 the reforming economies (less local damage from coal mining and burning) but also in the world at large (less greenhouse gas emissions of methane and carbon). Should domestically mined coal in the reforming countries also be more sulphuric than imported coal, the substitution by consumers away from domestic to imported coal in these countries also would reduce acid rain at home and in neighbouring down-wind countries.
Other countries that are net exporters of coal would benefit from the rise in the international coal price, as would net exporters of substitute fuels to a lesser extent, and conversely for net importers of energy. (This would have second-round effects on aggregate demand including the demand for coal, not shown in the diagram.) But the world economy as a whole would be better off, in addition to there being less local pollution in both the reforming countries and other economies8 as well as less greenhouse gas emissions (and even more so if those coal producer subsidies were replaced by optimal producer taxes).
It is true that, if enough coal-importing economies removed their coal production subsidies simultaneously, their loss from the adverse change in their terms of trade may more than offset their gain from reducing their coal market distortion. Even so, that does not alter the fact that each small reforming nation is better off economically and environmentally from so reforming, for to abstain while others reformed would make them even worse off because they would not have the domestic efficiency and environmental gains to offset their deteriorating terms of trade.
Effects of removing coal consumer subsidies
Consider now another type of small open economy that is a net exporter of coal, as depicted in Figure 2 . The notation and assumptions are otherwise as for Figure 1 and in particular both production and consumption externalities are still present. In this case, however, the country is pricing coal below rather than above the price at its border, P w . Specifically, suppose the country has taxed production so as to set the producer price optimally at P q * so that OQ* is being replacement of that tariff with an optimal consumption tax of P c *P w . 8 The only possible exception is in those non-reforming countries where the extra pollution from coal production expansion may more than offset the reduced pollution from cuts in coal use. Globally the increase in pollution from such production expansion is likely to be less than the reduction in pollution from coal mining in reforming mined per year; but instead of also taxing coal use it has provided a consumption subsidy equal to P w P c so that OC c rather than the optimal quantity of just OC* is being consumed each year. Thus instead of exports being C*Q* as under optimal national policies, they are just C c Q*. Removing that inappropriate consumer subsidy would lower consumption by CC c and consumer welfare by abvw, but it would also lower government outlays by ayvw and boost the welfare of those domestic residents outside this market who are harmed by the local pollution from coal burning by bvzk, hence net economic welfare would be greater by byzk. 9 (If the government not only abolished the consumer subsidy but also imposed the optimal consumer tax of P c *P w , there would be the additional net social welfare gain of jbk, or a total gain of jyz.) Thus both the economy and the environment in this reforming economy would improve. Should coal burning in these countries also contribute to acid rain at home and in neighbouring down-wind countries, the reduction in coal use would reduce that environmental damage too.
Should enough small open economies simultaneously reduce their subsidies to coal users (and replace any associated coal export tax with an optimal production tax -see footnote 5), two offsetting effects on the global environment would result. One is that coal consumption in these reforming economies would fall, lowering global carbon emissions. The other is that coal export supplies in the international market would rise, causing the price of coal in that market to fall.
That would encourage coal consumption in the rest of the world. Thus it is an empirical question as to whether there would be a net improvement or worsening of the global environment from carbon emissions, even though there is an unequivocal improvement in the local environment of these reforming countries.
Given their current low incomes, it is possible that some of these countries may place little or no negative value on their pollution from coal mining. In that case their optimal producer price would be P w and so reform also would involve lifting the currently low prices received by miners in those countries. That would add to production and to the increase in net exports from these reforming economies, and hence to their downward pressure on the international price of coal.
countries, however, since the latter tend to be among the deepest in the world. 9 As in the producer subsidy case, this consumer subsidy case could equally result from an export tax of P w P q * plus an additional consumer subsidy of just P q *P c . If P c = P q *, then only an export tax would have been necessary and the equivalent reform would be a replacement of that export tax with an optimal production tax of P q *P w .
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Other countries that are net importers of coal would benefit from the fall in the international coal price, as would net importers of substitute fuels to a lesser extent, and conversely for net energy exporters. (Again this would have second-round effects on aggregate demand, including the demand for coal, that are not shown in the diagram.) But the world economy as a whole would be better off by the removal of coal consumer subsidies, so long as the welfare gains in the reforming economies are not more than offset by the welfare loss from any increase in greenhouse gas emissions, should the latter occur.
If enough coal-exporting economies simultaneously removed their coal consumer subsidies (and possibly also their coal producer taxes), it is true that their loss from the adverse change in their terms of trade may more than offset their gain from removing their coal market distortions. Even so, as with the case of producer subsidy reform in the coal-importing countries, that does not alter the fact that each small reforming nation is better off economically and environmentally from so reforming, for if it abstained while others reformed it would be even worse off because it would not have the domestic efficiency and environmental gains to offset its deteriorating terms of trade.
Reforming producer and consumer subsidies simultaneously
If both sets of countries were to remove their coal subsidies simultaneously, the coal trade expansion would be greater but the change in the price of coal in the international market from producer subsidy cuts in rich countries would be more or less than offset by the change due to removing the coal price distortions in poorer countries. Hence the sign of the net price change, and of the changes in economic welfare in most countries, are empirical questions.
The answers to those questions also depend on the degrees of substitution in production and consumption as between coal, other fuels, and other products, the net effects of which can only be captured using a global multi-commodity model. In the next section we describe an intertemporal multi-country global general equilibrium model useful for that purpose, known as G-Cubed, discuss the simulation design to be used, and then present some empirical results.
Effects of dismantling coal subsidies: empirical general equilibrium analysis
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The G-Cubed multi-country model of the world economy
The G-Cubed multi-country model has been constructed specifically to contribute to the current policy debate on global warming, but it has many features that make it useful for answering a range of issues in environmental regulation and other economic policy questions. It is a global model with substantial regional disaggregation and sectoral detail. In the present version the world economy is divided into eight regions and the model distinguishes five energy sectors (electric utilities, natural gas utilities, petroleum processing, coal extraction, and crude oil and gas extraction) and seven non-energy sectors (mining, agriculture, forestry and wood products, durable manufacturing, non-durable manufacturing, transportation, and services). A key feature of the model is that substitution possibilities in production and consumption are based on econometrically estimated cost functions. Intertemporal budget constraints on households, governments and nations (the latter through accumulations of foreign debt) are imposed. To accommodate these constraints, forward looking behaviour is incorporated in consumption and investment decisions. Countries are linked not only by the flow of goods and factors of production but also flows of financial assets with rates of return based on returns in the real economy. The model has an internally consistent macroeconomic framework in which saving and investment decisions are determined endogenously. Overall, the model is designed to provide a bridge between computable general equilibrium models and macroeconomic models by integrating the more desirable features of both approaches. In addition, it includes an environmental module which provides information on changes in carbon emissions as economic activities change. Full details of the model are documented in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1995) .
Simulation design
Using this model we assume the divergences between domestic and international coal prices in 1990 were as shown in Table 4 . That table also shows the shares of each region in global coal production, consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions, as well as the importance of coal in primary energy use in each region. The model is then used to project the world economy from 15 1990 to 2050 under the assumption of no change in coal or any other policies. Given this baseline scenario we then present two scenarios as alternatives to a continuation of current policies, both phased in over the period 1996 to 2005. One scenario involves coal policy reforms just in OECD countries; the second scenario explores coal policy reforms in non-OECD regions as well.
Specifically, we analyse in the first case the effects of completely removing the coal producer subsidies and import restrictions in Japan and Western Europe, on the assumption that current consumer taxes there are optimal from the viewpoint of society's concerns with pollution from coal in those densely populated countries. 10 Removing coal producer subsidies and import restrictions in the protective OECD economies would be expected to lower their coal production and raise their coal imports, causing coal prices in international markets to rise and stimulating substitution away from coal use in all economies with open coal markets. In the second scenario, we also raise domestic coal prices in non-OECD countries up to international levels. This should have the effect of reducing coal consumption in these countries, thereby lowering their carbon emissions in so far as they use less fossil fuels in aggregate and they substitute towards less carbon-intensive fuels than coal. But that reform also raises prices received by coal producers in those non-OCED countries. This encourages coal production and hence net exports of coal from these countries, which would depress international coal prices and so encourage coal use and hence greenhouse gas emissions elsewhere.11 The interesting empirical question is whether the removal also of policies that depress domestic coal prices in non-OECD countries adds to or offsets the positive environmental effects of removing coal production subsidies and import restrictions in Western Europe and Japan.
Empirical results: removing OECD production subsidies and import restrictions
10 In fact, according to Hoeller and Coppel (1992, Chart 2) , the coal consumption tax per ton of carbon is far smaller in all OECD countries than the user taxes on oil and gas, whereas if coal is more pollutive its use should be taxed more rather than less than those other fuels. This suggests there is further scope for beneficial reform beyond that considered in this paper. 11 We assume that by the beginning of the simulated reform (1996) the coal-mining enterprises in transition economies are operating as normal profit centres. In so far as some state-owned mining enterprises are in fact still being propped up by government subsidies to cover operating losses and these are removed over the simulated reform period to 2005, then we will have overstated the coal supply response in these economies and thereby understated the contribution of reform to reducing global carbon emission.
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The assumed policy decision to phase out production subsidies for coal in Western Europe These changes can be understood by first recognising that the removal of OECD coal production subsidies leads to a rise in the price of coal in international markets and hence in all regions where domestic prices respond to changes in international prices. That stimulates coal output in and net exports from all other regions. The rise in the user price of coal also leads to a substitution away from coal as an energy source and away from producing carbon-intensive goods whose prices in international markets also rise. Thus emissions fall in most OECD countries. The exception is Australia where, as in the non-OECD regions, carbon emissions rise very slightly. This is because those regions, as net exporters of coal, enjoy a terms of trade gain and hence an income boost: although their coal prices rise and the share of carbon-intensive energy falls relative to other energy sources used (as occurs elsewhere in the world), the absolute amount of carbonbased energy use nonetheless increases due the effects of higher incomes and foreign direct investment inflows on aggregate demand in these economies.
In addition to these effects, a number of other factors are at work. In particular, the phasing out of coal production subsidies has a direct impact on the fiscal positions of governments that have been paying the subsidies. The saving in fiscal outlays is assumed to be used to reduce fiscal deficits in those countries. In Western Europe especially this is a substantial saving which, through macroeconomic adjustments, helps to offset the effect on the economy of the adverse terms of trade change due to the rise in the international price of coal. This beneficial fiscal effect is absent in North America, Australiasia, and the non-OECD regions where there are assumed to 17 be no policy changes, hence firms in these regions face higher input costs for energy without any compensatory offset from greater domestic saving lowering the cost of capital.
It should be stressed that the decline in carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use that is depicted in Figure 3 The effects on national outputs and incomes are more diverse. Figure 4 contains results for GDP, again as a deviation from baseline. GDP is the value added by domestically located factors of production in each economy. This is a measure of aggregate production change rather than being a direct measure of economic welfare because of the international movements of capital allowed for in the G-Cubed model. GNP, on the other hand, is a measure of income to domestically owned factors of production no matter where they are located. Thus it is a better measure of economic well-being of domestic residents since it measures their income from all domestically owned factors of production. It does not include the negative valuation society places on greenhouse gas emissions though, and so will understate the gains in welfare from policy changes that reduce those emissions.
In Western Europe (ROECD in the figures), the rise in energy import prices and hence the prices to users leads to a fall in GDP during the adjustment period as industries respond to higher input costs and the economy adjusts to the deterioration in its terms of trade. By 2005, when the coal production subsidies are completely removed, the gains from reallocating resources within
Western Europe begin to offset the negative shock of higher energy import prices.12 By about 2020 those economies have adjusted to the change in relative prices and GDP returns to close to baseline. The recovery in its GDP is also due to the permanently higher level of saving by Western
European governments as a result of the fiscal savings from the reduction in subsidies. As in Japan, gains from an improvement in economic efficiency and the government budget in Europe outweigh the impact of slightly higher coal import prices and hence user prices of coal within the domestic economy. Countries with a relative abundance of coal experience a terms of trade improvement, by contrast, and hence enjoy a rise in GDP (most notably Australia, China and the EEFSU region).
Bear in mind, though, that these GDP changes are not the same as changes in GNP in particular regions. This is because the G-Cubed model used here allows for foreign capital flows which adjust to changes in market conditions, as is evident by comparing Figures 4 and 5. Western
Europe, for example, exports financial capital to other regions under this scenario so as to take advantage of now-higher earnings abroad than at home. These higher earnings are reflected in GNP.
Thus the reforms, although leading to a lower level of GDP relative to baseline for Western Europe, raise incomes there by 2014 because some of the capital released from the coal and fossil-fuel intensive industries (or that would otherwise have been invested in those industries) eventually earns a higher return overseas than it would have if it had stayed in those industries as in the baseline.
Overall, the effect of cutting coal production subsidies in the OECD is to reduce significantly the emission of carbon dioxide, particularly in the OECD. Even though this leads to some minor increase in carbon dioxide emissions in relatively carbon-intensive developing countries due to substitution away from the production of carbon-intensive goods in the OECD, this "leakage" effect is a negligible offset to the OECD's carbon emission reduction -in contrast to the leakage that would occur under an international agreement in which only OECD countries voluntarily agreed to curtail their carbon dioxide emissions while imposing no disciplines on non-OECD countries' emissions. The reason to expect substantial leakage in the latter case is because a voluntary cut-back in carbon emissions in the OECD would cause a major reduction in OECD coal use and hence in the international price of coal, thereby encouraging expanded use of coal in non-OECD regions.13
Empirical results: effects of removing also coal consumer subsidies and export taxes in non-
0ECD regions
Now consider the effect of adding to the phase-out of OECD production subsidies (which 13 How large that leakage would be depends on the nature of any international agreement of course. Numerous attempts have been made to simulate various possibilities. An early example is Piggott, Whalley and Wigle (1992) . See also ABARE and DFAT (1995) , McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1996) , and the surveys in Winters (1992) and IPCC (1996, Ch. 11). began earlier this decade) a phase-out of coal market distortions in non-OECD economies (which are just beginning, most notably in China and Central Europe). In this scenario we also completely remove the subsidy to consumption of coal and the tax on coal production (together with any associated export restriction) to bring coal prices to international market levels in the non-OECD economies. The results for the combined simulation are shown in Figures 6 through 8.
As expected, the consequent rise in coal prices in the non-OECD economies leads to an expansion of coal production and a contraction of coal use within those economies. The expansion of production relative to consumption implies an increase in net exports from non-OECD to OECD economies, which on its own reduces the price of coal in international markets and hence in these economies, offsetting slightly the rise due to the OECD's production subsidy cuts. The effects on total carbon emissions, shown in Figure 6 , are the net effect of the removal of both OECD and non-OECD coal market distortions compared with no reform. In this case emissions from non-OECD countries also fall as their consumption subsidies are removed. By 2005 carbon dioxide emissions from non-OECD economies are 4 per cent lower, when both OECD and non-OECD policies are reformed together, than otherwise would have been the case.
To understand the effect of the non-OECD policy reform alone, the first set of simulation results should be subtracted from the combined results. We showed in the simulation results for the OECD policy reform that emissions from non-OECD economies rose slightly. Thus the effect of non-OECD policies on reducing non-OECD emissions are slightly larger than shown in Figure   6 . There is only a very slight rise in OECD emissions as a result of the lower price of coal in international markets in this as compared with the previous scenario, an effect that is dwarfed by Not only do the transition and developing economies gain in terms of emission reduction, 20 but as well the changes in production contained in Figure 7 show that GDP rises in each of these regions. This is due to the efficiency gains from reducing their production and consumption distortions. Resources are freed up from the distorted sectors and reallocated through the global economy, yielding higher rates of return. EEFSU output expands substantially, while developing country output hardly alters in this combined scenario as compared with the reduction in output shown in Figure 4 in which just the OECD countries reform.
Again the GNP effects are somewhat different from the GDP ones. While the GNPs of the transition and developing economies are raised by this combined reform, as compared with either no policy changes or just OECD reform, Australia's GNP is eventually lowered slightly when the non-OECD countries also reform. The latter is mainly because the terms of trade of coalexporting and capital-importing Australia gradually deteriorate as the non-OECD countries' net exports of coal expand.
Conclusion
This paper has examined distortions in global coal markets that point to a significant subsidization of coal production in OECD economies and significant coal consumption subsidies in developing and transition economies -when the opposite policies are what are needed to overcome the environmental policies associated with coal mining and burning. Model-based empirical evidence summarized here suggests that the gradual removal of production subsidies in the OECD and the removal of distortions to coal markets in developing and transition economies can potentially reduce global emissions of carbon dioxide by up to 8 per cent relative to emissions that otherwise would have been experienced early next century. This environmental gain is achieved with gains in economic efficiency rather than economic costs -a win-win outcome for the environment and the economy. Both gains would be even greater if Western European countries raised also their low coal consumer tax rates as they phase out their coal producer subsidies, since those consumer taxes are currently relatively low (see footnotes 10 and 12 above), presumably to lower the cost to electricity utilities or requiring them to use lower-quality locally mined coal. And both gains would also be enhanced if countries taxed domestic coal 21 production optimally so as to ensure coal mining enterprises compensate society for the pollution they cause.
Thankfully the process of lowering coal subsidies and trade barriers has already begun, with some EU economies (most notably Belgium and the UK) already advanced in dismantling their coal production subsidies and others (France and Germany) beginning to do so. And in some transition economies the low prices of coal (and also oil and gas) are gradually being raised. For example, in China many state-owned coal mines are being transferred out of the hands of the state and gradually subjected to domestic market forces. The results in this paper suggest these reforms should be applauded as a positive contribution to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and countries should be encouraged to complete the process. (1994a,b,c,d) , BP (1994 ), World Resources Institute (1996 and the references on distortions cited in the text and the above tables.
